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NOTE
The “Raised Eyebrow” Test Produces
Further Head-Scratching: Punitive Damages
in Ondrisek v. Hoffman
698 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2012)

VALERIE SHANDS*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s the federal courts have struggled with how to address
the perceived increase in the amount and frequency of punitive damages
awards.1 The Supreme Court of the United States finally created a judicial
test to determine when an award was so excessive that it violated due process,2 yet it remains ambiguous and difficult for lower courts to apply.3 The
test involves weighing the reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions, the
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and the comparable
criminal and civil punishments typically imposed upon a similar bad actor.4
The most weight is to be given to the reprehensibility prong.5 The ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages is supposed to be close to 4:1, or if the

* B.A., University of Kansas, B.A. J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2014.
1. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he frequency and size of [punitive damages] awards
have been skyrocketing.”); Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 23 (tracking the growth of
punitive damages awards in the 1970s and 1980s).
2. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“Only when an
award can fairly be categorized as ‘grossly excessive’ in relation to these interests
does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
3. See generally Neil B. Stekloff, Raising Five Eyebrows: Substantive Due
Process Review of Punitive Damages Awards After BMW v. Gore, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 1797, 1817 (discussing how the judicial test “do[es] not provide much guidance
to future courts in reviewing punitive damages awards for substantive due process
violations”).
4. Gore, 571 U.S. at 574-75.
5. Id. at 575.
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case involves substantial compensatory damages, 1:1, but at all times certainly less than 10:1.6
The Eighth Circuit has used the test for the past eight years to varying
effect.7 The circumstances of the instant case, Ondrisek v. Hoffman, lent
themselves well to the possible re-evaluation of how the Eighth Circuit
applies the Supreme Court’s test. Ondrisek is unique in that the Defendant’s
actions are the most reprehensible reviewed by the Eighth Circuit since
the test was revised in 2003.8 This case, therefore, gave the Eighth Circuit
an opportunity to clarify the application of the test and set forth clear standards by using Ondrisek as a high-water mark against which future cases
could have been be measured. Unfortunately, the Eighth Circuit did not
seize this opportunity and kept a previous, less reprehensible case as its highwater mark.
Although the Eighth Circuit declined to make any changes, Ondrisek
remains an excellent opportunity to review the court’s punitive damages jurisprudence and detect trends in its application. When compared to other
Eighth Circuit cases since the Supreme Court laid out the punitive damages
test, Ondrisek reveals that the Eighth Circuit tends to consider cases with
“substantial” compensatory damages to be $500,000 and over,9 whereas the
Supreme Court tends to consider “substantial” to be $1 million and over.10
While the Eighth Circuit has a lower threshold for what constitutes “substantial” compensatory damages, it will more frequently apply a ratio higher than
1:1, despite the Supreme Court’s contrary recommendation.11 Furthermore,
the Eighth Circuit tends to emphasize the ratio prong of the test, not the reprehensibility prong, as the most important factor.12 The Eighth Circuit also
de-emphasizes the third prong of the test, comparable criminal and civil punishments, to such an extent that it is sometimes completely omitted.13
Ondrisek reveals that although the Eighth Circuit uses the same test as
the Supreme Court, it certainly applies it differently.14 When comparing
Ondrisek and other Eighth Circuit cases, one sees a subtle pattern that diverg6. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); Gore,
517 U.S. at 581; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991).
7. Compare Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594, 603
(8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 1:1 ratio was proper), with Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698
F.3d 1020, 1030 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding a 10:1 ratio unconstitutional), and Haynes v.
Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152, 1158 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding a 2,500:1 ratio proper).
8. See infra Appendix A.
9. Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2004).
10. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008); State Farm, 538
U.S. at 425.
11. See infra Part V.B. for a chart depicting the application of the Gore Guideposts in Eighth Circuit Cases.
12. See infra Part.V.B.2.
13. See infra Part V.B.4.
14. See infra Part V.C.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss3/8

2

File: 7.Shands.F

2013]

Created on: 1/27/2014 6:36:00 PM
Shands: Shands:
Raised Eyebrow Test

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ONDRISEK

Last Printed: 1/27/2014 9:12:00 PM

919

es from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. However, these differences are
not yet distinct enough for the Supreme Court to have granted certiorari to
resolve the inconsistencies.15

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
A. Background
In Ondrisek v. Hoffman, two eighteen-year old escapees from a religious
cult sued the group’s leader for battery, outrage, and conspiracy.16 Spencer
Ondrisek and Seth Calagna, Plaintiffs, were both raised in Tony Alamo
Christian Ministries (TACM), 17 an obscure religious sect led by Tony Alamo,
18
a self-professed “spiritual leader” and “prophet” of God.19 Alamo and
TACM espouse a variety of “unorthodox religious beliefs,” 20 such as polygamy, child brides, public beatings, compulsory fasting for children, and government conspiracy.21 Alamo also taught that those who leave TACM become homosexuals and go to hell.22 Alamo had complete control of members’ finances23 and instituted a variety of rules that resulted in near-complete
isolation from the outside world.24 At age eight, the Plaintiffs were made to
work several hours per day without pay,25 which allegedly grew to forty
hours per week by age fifteen, and seventy hours per week by age eighteen.26
Both boys endured considerable physical and verbal abuse.27 The Plaintiffs alleged that they had to listen daily to “rebuke tapes,” wherein Alamo
told TACM members that they would never amount to anything and would go
to hell.28 Alamo himself told Ondrisek as a child that if he disobeyed, he

15. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari.
Hoffman v. Ondirsek, 133 S. Ct. 1820 (2013).
16. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 2012).
17. Id. at 1023.
18. Id. at 1020. Tony Alamo is the pseudonym of Bernie Hoffman. Id. at 1023.
19. Appellant’s Opening Brief Amended, Ondrisek, 698 F.3d 1020 (No. 113003), 2012 WL 948049, at *2.
20. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1028.
21. Brief of Appellees, Ondrisek, 698 F.3d 1020 (No. 11-3003), 2012 WL
1029825, at *2-6.
22. Id. at *5.
23. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1023.
24. Id. This included not traveling outside of the TACM compounds unaccompanied, not speaking to outsiders unless it was to “witness,” not attending public
school, not watching television, and not listening to the radio. Id.
25. Id.
26. Brief of Appellees, supra note 21, at *7.
27. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1024.
28. Brief of Appellees, supra note 21, at *6.
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would be enlisted in the military and shot.29 Moreover, Alamo even admitted
to having the Plaintiffs “hit in the face, with open handed slaps” fifteen to
twenty times, then “hit with a wooden paddle” by an adult twenty to forty
times.30 This happened on multiple occasions when the Plaintiffs were as
young as twelve.31 The bases for these punishments were minor offenses,
such as horseplay or talking about Harry Potter.32 These serious beatings,
carried out at Alamo’s direction by his enforcer, John Kolbeck, resulted in
bruising, blood, and swelling that did not abate for days or weeks, and even
resulted in permanent damage.33 These beatings were so severe on one occasion that Ondrisek passed out and Calagna vomited on himself.34 The beatings were not exclusive to the Plaintiffs; at age fourteen, Calagna was forced
to watch as his elderly father was beaten until he was crying and could not
stand or crawl.35 Both Plaintiffs contemplated suicide, “unable to imagine
that death would be worse” than what they had to suffer through on a daily
basis.36 The boys escaped separately from the compound at age eighteen, but
remain plagued by nightmares, flashbacks, and other psychological issues.37
Ondrisek v. Hoffman was not the first lawsuit brought in connection
with TACM and Alamo. Plaintiffs also sued the enforcer who actually hit the
boys, Kolbeck, in a separate suit, resulting in a damages award of $500,000 in
compensatory damages and $1 million dollars in punitive damages for the
Plaintiffs.38 In an earlier case, Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation,
Alamo was sued for battery and the emotional distress of two other boys.39
An adult hit the boys with a paddle 10 times and 140 times respectively, in
very much the same circumstances as the Plaintiffs were abused in
Ondrisek.40 The first boy received $1,000 in compensatory damages and
$5,000 in punitive damages, and the second received $50,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages (a 5:1 and 10:1 ratio respectively).41 The district court characterized Alamo’s conduct as “monstrous”
and “cold blooded.”42 Throughout the years, the Secretary of Labor has repeatedly sued TACM for not paying its workers, improper recordkeeping, and

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at *7.
Appellant’s Opening Brief Amended, supra note 19, at *5-6, *13.
Id.
Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1024.
Id. Ondrisek has permanent scarring and damage to his hand. Id.
Brief of Appellees, supra note 21, at *12, *15.
Id. at *10-11.
Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1024 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Brief of Appellees, supra note 22, at *12-13, *18.
Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1030.
748 F. Supp. 695 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
Id. at 697, 699.
Id. at 698-99.
Id. at 698, 700.
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other labor law violations.43 More recently, Alamo was convicted and received a 175-year sentence and $250,000 in fines44 on “10 counts of transporting minors across state lines for illicit sex.”45 These minors were known
in the media as “child brides” who had been “spiritually wed” to Alamo when
they were allegedly as young as eight.46

B. At Trial
The Plaintiffs sued Alamo in Federal Court, alleging battery, outrage,
and conspiracy.47 At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs, awarding $3 million each in compensatory damages and $30 million
each in punitive damages, which the district court declined to remit.48
Alamo raised four points of error on appeal: first, that he should be
found not liable under the First Amendment freedom of religion clause; second, the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury in his proposed
instruction on battery, which included a statement about corporal punishment
being a complete defense to battery; third, that there was insufficient evidence
for a finding of outrage; and fourth, that the compensatory and punitive damages were excessive.49
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.50 It summarily dismissed Alamo’s first three claims.51 As to
his First Amendment freedom of religion claim, the court merely noted that
freedom of religious belief was not absolute and does not extend to permitting
“injuries to the ‘equal rights of others.’”52 It also held that any error on the
part of the district judge in not instructing the jury about corporal punishment
as a complete defense to battery was harmless and did not affect the amount

43. See, e.g., Brock v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 842 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir.
1998) (affirming a district court award of relief for employees under the Fair Labor
Standards Act); Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 722 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.
1983) (holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to the Foundation due to its
commercial purpose, and as such, its employees were covered by the Act’s provisions), aff’d Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
44. Jon Grambell, Tony Alamo, Evangelist, Sentenced to 175 Years for Sex
Crimes, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2009, 8:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2009/11/13/Tony-Alamo-Evangelist-Sen_n_357709.html.
45. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 2012).
46. Women: We were Child Brides in U.S., CNN (June 23, 2010, 9:15 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/06/23/o.child.brides.stories/index.html.
47. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1024.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1031.
51. Id. at 1024-27.
52. Id. at 1024.
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of compensatory damages.53 With regard to Alamo’s claim that his conduct
did not rise to the level of outrage, the court held that they did not have the
power to review this point because it was not preserved for appeal.54
Next, the court turned to the issue of the compensatory damages.55 It
determined that “[t]he jury properly weighed the evidence, finding that Alamo continually verbally and physically abused Ondrisek and Calagna” and
that Alamo’s part in orchestrating and supervising the beatings “justif[ied] the
compensatory damages awarded against him.”56 Finally, the court weighed
the jury’s 10:1 punitive damages ratio.57 Under the Gore factors for punitive
damages,58 the court determined that this case was one of “extreme reprehensibility” and “justif[ied] significant punitive damages,” but found the $30
million in punitive damages to be excessive due to the high punitive-tocompensatory damages ratio.59 It remitted that amount to $12 million each (a
4:1 ratio).60 In remitting the punitive damages award, the Eighth Circuit held
that no matter how reprehensible the defendant’s actions, a ratio of 10:1 cannot be sustained, and Eden Electrical remains the high water mark. 61

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip was the first case in which
the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause may require limitations
on the size of punitive damage awards.62 The Haslips had purchased bundled
health and life insurance through Pacific Mutual, under which Pacific Mutual
would provide the life insurance coverage and Union would provide the
health insurance.63 The Haslips were to send one check for both insurance
payments to Pacific Mutual, who was to send Union’s share of the insurance
premiums on to Union’s office.64 However, the Haslips’ Pacific Mutual insurance agent misappropriated most of their payments for himself and did not
forward their premiums on to Union, so the Haslips’ health insurance cover-

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1026-27.
Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1027.
Id.
Id. at 1029.
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574, 580, 583 (1996).
Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1029, 1030-31.
Id. at 1031.
See infra Part V.C.
499 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1991).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
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age lapsed.65 Unsurprisingly, the agent did not inform the Haslips of the
lapse, so when the Haslips needed their health insurance, but were denied for
nonpayment, they sued.66
The Supreme Court upheld the jury’s punitive damages award of
“more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages, [and] more than
200 times the out-of-pocket expenses of respondent Haslip” given the
“objective criteria” of the case, but did note that the award “may be close to
the line” of constitutional excessiveness.67 The Court held that giving a judge
or jury unlimited discretion to determine the amount of punitive damages
could create “extreme results that jar one’s constitutional sensibilities.”68 It
went on to say that this danger could be mitigated by “reasonableness and
adequate guidance from the court,” but did not provide such guidance.69 In
her dissent, Justice O’Connor argued that the majority had not gone far
enough in limiting punitive damages,70 given the recent “explosion in the
frequency and size of punitive damages awards”71 where “[m]edians as well
as averages [were] skyrocketing.”72
Two years later, another excessive punitive damages case came before
the Supreme Court in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.73
In that case, the jury awarded the plaintiff $19,000 in compensatory damages
for slander of title and $10 million in punitive damages.74 The Court rejected
both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s proposed tests for the validity of punitive damages75 and declined to make any bright line rule or test regarding
what would be considered an unconstitutionally large punitive damages
award.76 The Court explicitly rejected considering the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages, holding that “we do not consider the dramatic disparity between the actual damages and the punitive award controlling in a case
of this character.”77 In affirming the 524:1 ratio, the Court held that the
award was not “so ‘grossly excessive’” as to be impermissible.78

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 18.
Id.
See id. at 43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 462.
Id.
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This seeming reversal from Haslip, which had suggested that any ratio
higher than 4:1 approached the limits of due process,79 was justified by
the Court in a later case on the rationale that the TXO court had affirmed
the award on the basis of “the harm to the victim that would have ensued
if the tortious plan had succeeded,” which would have been “not more than
10 to 1.”80
Just three years later, however, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
the Court did exactly what it had declined to do in Haslip and TXO: it created
a test to measure the validity of punitive damages.81 In this landmark
case, Gore sued the manufacturer of his “new” BMW car, which he discovered had sustained minor damage, been repainted, and passed off as new in
accordance with BMW’s national policy.82 The jury awarded compensatory
damages of $4,000, but also awarded him $4 million in punitive damages.83
The Alabama Supreme Court reduced this amount to $2 million (a 1000:1
ratio to a 500:1 ratio), on the grounds that BMW could not be punished for
out-of-state actions.84
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court for the first time struck
down a jury award as excessive and in violation of the Due Process Clause.85
It held that in order to be in line with the Constitution, a punitive award
must comport with a test (the Gore Test): (1) the award must relate to the
conduct occurring within the state;86 (2) the defendant must receive fair notice of the conduct that will subject him to punishment; and (3) the defendant
must have fair notice of the severity of the penalty that the state may impose.87 It produced three important “Guideposts” (the Gore Guideposts) for
lower courts to follow in regards to the third element: (1) the “degree of reprehensibility” of the defendants’ actions; (2) the ratio between compensatory
and punitive damages; and (3) the difference between the given punitive
damage award and the criminal and civil penalties for similar conduct.88 The
most important Guidepost to consider is the “degree of reprehensibility” of
the defendant’s conduct.”89
79. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991). It must be noted
that Haslip focused on what procedures must be followed by a jury when determining
punitive damages and not so much on setting forth a quantitative ratio for determining
those damages. Id. at 18. The “test” set forth by Haslip may therefore be better characterized as persuasive dicta than substantive law.
80. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996) (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 574-75.
82. Id. at 563-64.
83. Id. at 565.
84. Id. at 567.
85. Id. at 574-75.
86. Id. at 572.
87. Id. at 574.
88. Id. at 574-75.
89. Id. at 575.
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When considering the first Guidepost, the degree of reprehensibility, the
Court approved consideration of several factors (the Gore Factors), including:
if the harm was physical or economic; whether the conduct was in reckless
disregard for the health and safety of others; whether it was intentional, malicious, or deceitful; whether the target of the conduct was in a vulnerable position; and whether the defendant repeatedly engaged in the conduct even
knowing that it was harmful.90
When considering the second Gore Factor, the ratio, the Court again
“rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the
punitive award.”91 The Court went on to say that low compensatory awards
may justify a higher ratio, and higher awards may support a lower ratio.92 It
concluded that “[i]n most cases, the ratio will be within a constitutionally
acceptable range, and remittitur will not be justified . . . .”93 Thus, the Court
did not provide even a suggestion of an appropriate ratio, merely noting that
when the punitive damage award was so great as to be “breathtaking” it
“must surely ‘raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.’”94
The dissenting opinions, one written by Justice Antonin Scalia and
joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, and one written by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, vehemently opposed the majority’s new test.95 Scalia noted that
the determination of punitive damages is not an analytical decision, since it
measures the “community’s sense of indignation or outrage” and what punishment the defendant deserves, and it is therefore best left to the jury, “the
voice of the community,” to decide.96 He also claimed that the test set forth
by the majority “does nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal
analysis upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular award of
punitive damages was not ‘fair.’”97 Scalia critically remarked, “In truth, the
‘guideposts’ mark a road to nowhere; they provide no real guidance at all.”98
Ginsburg voiced a similar opinion, noting that the majority’s test was so
vague it ultimately only amounted to a “raised eyebrow” test.99
The last punitive damages case of note decided by the Supreme Court
was State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell in 2003.100 In
this case, the Campbells attempted to pass six cars at once on a two-lane
Id. at 576.
Id. at 582 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 583.
Id. (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481
(1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
95. Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 606.
98. Id. at 605.
99. Id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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highway, resulting in a deadly car accident.101 The Campbells, who were
uninjured, were eventually found to be 100% at fault.102 Even though State
Farm’s investigators knew Mr. Campbell was likely at fault, it decided to
contest the claim and declined a settlement offer from both other parties for
$50,000, the policy limit.103 Moreover, it assured the Campbells that they
were safe from liability and that they did not need to procure separate counsel.104 State Farm agents altered their records to make the Campbells seem
less culpable.105 When the Campbells were found to be liable for nearly
$186,000 in damages in the ensuing jury trial, the insurance company refused
to pay the extra and told the Campbells to put a for sale sign on their house.106
The Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith.107
The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in actual damages and
$145 million dollars in punitive damages.108 The district court remitted the
actual damages to $1 million, but upheld the punitive award (a 145:1 ratio).109
The Supreme Court, however, determined that the case was “neither close nor
difficult,” and held that the punitive damages award was grossly excessive
and in violation of the Due Process Clause.110 The Court held that “in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”111 The
Court quoted the 4:1 ratio from Haslip, holding that this ratio is “instructive”
but not “binding.”112 It went on to note that “[w]hen compensatory damages
are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.”113 The
Court found that the $1 million dollars of compensatory damages were substantial and remanded the case.114

Id. at 412-13.
Id.
Id. at 413.
Id.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 413.
Id.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 415-16.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court gave further weight to this 1:1
ratio in the maritime case of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, holding that the 5:1 punitive damages levied against Exxon for the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska were excessive and a 1:1 ratio was appropriate. 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008).
114. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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B. Eighth Circuit Jurisprudence
The Eighth Circuit has dealt with nine cases involving significant punitive damages awards similar to those in Ondrisek.115 In Williams v. ConAgra
Poultry Co. an employee sued his company for hostile work environment and
wrongful termination based upon disparate treatment116 and numerous instances of “egregious racial harassment” against black workers.117 This
harassment included racist remarks and “threatening actions, such as nooses
left at the work stations of black employees, a black doll hung by a noose in
the factory, and invitations extended to black employees to attend Ku Klux
Klan (KKK) hunting parties at which they would be the hunted.”118 None of
the actions were directed at the plaintiff personally.119 The Eighth Circuit
noted that it was unclear how many of these incidents actually affected the
Plaintiff; who seemed to have wholesale adopted the allegations of another
employee in an earlier case.120 The jury awarded him approximately $2 million in compensatory damages and $12 million in punitive damages.121 The
court remitted the damages to $600,000 each,122 in part because the award
was far in excess of what an analogous case under Title VII would allow
($30,000)123 and because the ratio exceeded the level that the Supreme Court
suggested was constitutional.124 Notably, the court held that the $600,000
award here was “a lot of money,” enough to fall into the 1:1 ratio for substantial awards suggested in State Farm.125 The court did not examine the reprehensibility of the employer’s conduct under the Gore Factors, simply noting
that it was not so “egregiously reprehensible” to warrant a higher ratio than
the recommended 1:1.126
Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C. involved a malpractice action
against a nursing home after nurses carelessly and fraudulently mischarted an
elderly patient’s condition and failed to treat her or contact the physician,
even after the patient complained and asked several times for the doctor.127
The decedent died in the hospital of a perforated bowel after several days of
constipation; the doctor testified that she appeared to be pregnant due to the
115. This Note was researched and written in November, 2012, and has not been
updated for new Eighth Circuit cases meeting this criteria since that time.
116. 378 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 2004).
117. Id. at 796.
118. Id. at 793.
119. Id. at 794.
120. Id. at 797-98.
121. Id. at 793.
122. Id. at 799.
123. Id. at 798.
124. Id. at 796.
125. Id. at 799.
126. Id.
127. 377 F.3d 827, 830-31 (8th Cir. 2004).
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amount of free stool in her abdomen.128 The jury awarded the patient’s estate
$500,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages,
which was more than eight times the company’s net worth.129 In contrast to
Williams, the court fully detailed the Gore Guideposts, finding the degree of
reprehensibility to be substantial,130 the $500,000 of compensatory damages
to be likewise substantial,131 and the legal penalties to be nowhere near the
amount necessary to warrant such a high award.132 The court concluded that
the 4:1 ratio suggested in Haslip was appropriate and remitted the punitive
damages award to $2 million.133
Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Industries, Inc. arose from a contract
dispute wherein a manufacturer unlawfully terminated Diesel Machinery’s
franchise agreement with them.134 Eight months into the contract the
manufacturer unilaterally terminated the agreement because it had acquired
another product line and planned to use that line’s pre-existing dealer network
to sell its products.135 The manufacturer had terminated several other dealership agreements across the country.136 The jury awarded the plaintiff
company $665,000 in actual damages and $4.3 million in punitive damages,
which the district court remitted to $2.66 million.137 On appeal, the court
set forth the Gore factors and determined that the last two, repetitive conduct
and deliberate intent,138 were present, and that the manufacturer’s conduct
was “sufficiently reprehensible to justify the punitive damage award [of
4:1].”139 It also rejected the contention that the award was substantial enough
to justify a 1:1 ratio, relying on the 4:1 ratio and $500,000 compensatory
award in Stodsgill.140 Finally, it noted that while the criminal penalties were
minimal, the civil penalties “could be substantial.”141 The court ultimately
upheld the award.142
In JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, a manufacturer of heavy construction equipment and a bank were both creditors of Machinery, Inc., who
had bought construction equipment from JCB on credit and taken out a

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 830.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 834.
Id.
418 F.3d 820, 826 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 827-28.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 839.
Id. at 840.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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loan from the bank.143 Machinery, Inc. filed for bankruptcy and JCB took
back its equipment.144 The bank, however, unlawfully entered onto JCB’s
property, repossessed the equipment without notice, and auctioned it off
despite JCB’s protests.145 The jury found for JCB on the conversion claim
(awarding $1,446,500 in compensatory and $1,150,000 in punitive damages)
and on the trespass claim (awarding $1 in nominal damages and a $1,087,500
punitive damages award).146 The court determined that the reprehensibility
of the bank’s conduct in this case was comparable to that of the defendant
in Diesel Machinery.147 On the conversion claim the court held that, given
that the amount of compensatory damages was substantial, a 1:1 ratio
was warranted.148 On the trespass claim the court reduced the award by one
tenth to $108,750, given the minimal criminal punishment and comparable
civil cases.149
Moore v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. was another bad faith
insurance claim, wherein the plaintiff’s newly purchased duplex was destroyed by a fire and the insurance company refused to pay on the unsubstantiated theory that Moore had intentionally set fire to the duplex.150 The jury
returned an award of approximately $1.15 million in actual damages and
$1.15 million in punitive damages.151 The court concluded that the harm to
Mr. Moore was more than simple economic harm since he suffered reputational harm, emotional distress, and economic harm from the criminal charges
filed against him when he was accused of arson.152 Moreover, there was evidence that the insurance company’s treatment of the Moore claim “was typical of how it handled similar claims.”153 The civil penalties for the insurance
company’s actions could have included the loss of their license in the forum
state, which the judge noted “might well prove much more costly than a punitive damages award” of $1.15 million.154 The court ultimately concluded that
the “relevant ratio here is one to one and well within the acceptable range.”155
In White v. McKinley, White sued his ex-wife, Tina, and a police officer
for various torts and violations of his constitutional rights after Tina falsely
accused him of molesting her daughter.156 White married Tina, who had two
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

539 F.3d 862, 867 (8th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 868.
Id.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 877.
576 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id. at 790.
Id.
Id. at 791.
Id.
605 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 2010).
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children from a previous marriage.157 The biological father agreed to terminate his parental rights so that White could adopt the children, but only after
Tina threatened to charge the biological father with child molestation.158
When her subsequent marriage to White deteriorated, Tina made a false police report about White shoving her, and when the police came to talk to her
about the report she alleged that White had been molesting her daughter for
years.159 The officer investigating the charges began a sexual relationship
with Tina and throughout the investigation made several crucial errors and
omissions that would likely have exonerated White.160 In an effort to avoid
wrongful incarceration, White fled the country, but was captured and returned.161 In his suit against Tina and the officer, the jury found in favor of
White and awarded $14 million dollars in actual damages and $1 million in
punitive damages against both Tina and the officer.162 Only the officer challenged the award as excessive.163 The court did not quantify the reprehensibility of the officer’s conduct or consider comparable civil or criminal punishments, but when affirming simply noted that the punitive damages award
was only 7% of the actual damages award.164
In Ondrisek, the Eighth Circuit gave great consideration to three previous cases it had decided.165 The first case was Eden Electrical, Ltd. v. Amana
Co., in which Amana, a manufacturing company, decided to induce a “sucker” distributing company (Eden Electrical) to enter into an exclusive dealership agreement it had no intention of honoring.166 In this agreement, Amana
would offload outdated “junk” inventory onto the distributor in exchange for
$2.4 million dollars.167 As soon as Eden Electrical paid them the money,
Amana terminated the distributorship, ceased communications, and appointed
another company to be its real distributor.168 Amana’s agents had expressed a
desire to “f***” and “kill” Eden Electrical after taking its money in the sham
dealership plot.169 Throughout the discovery and trial process Amana and its
executives further lied and perjured themselves in an effort to cover up their
intentional wrongdoing.170 The jury awarded $2.1 million dollars in compensatory damages and $18 million dollars in punitive damages; the trial judge
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 529-30.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 538-39.
Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 2012).
258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 961-62 (N.D. Iowa 2003).
Id.
Id. at 963.
Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 370 F.3d 824, 829 (8th Cir. 2004).
Eden Elec., 258 F. Supp. 2d at 963-64.
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remitted the punitive damages award to $10 million dollars.171 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the 4.8:1 ratio172 on the grounds that Defendant’s
conduct was “extraordinarily reprehensible.”173
The second case the Eighth Circuit emphasized, Consenco Finance
Servicing Corp. v. North American Mortgage Co., involved mortgage companies competing in the subprime lending market.174 North American
Mortgage (NAM) solicited several of Consenco’s employees to leave
Consenco for NAM and encouraged those employees to bring with them
some of Consenco’s information on which customers to target and said customers’ private financial information.175 At trial, the jury found for Consenco
on its claims and awarded it $3.5 million in actual damages and $18 million
in punitive damages (a 5.1:1 ratio).176 The district court declined to remit the
punitive damages award.177 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that NAM’s
conduct was “sufficiently reprehensible” to support punitive damages, but
given “the nature of [NAM’s] conduct and the harm suffered solely by
Consenco,” it determined that the award was excessive and remitted it to $7
million (a 2:1 ratio). 178
The third case was Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., in
which the widower of a lifelong smoker sued the makers of Pall Mall cigarettes.179 At trial, the jury found for the plaintiff on his defective design claim
and awarded him a little over $4 million in compensatory damages and $15
million in punitive damages (a 3.5:1 ratio).180 The Eighth Circuit held that
Defendant’s conduct was “highly reprehensible,” in that:
Pall Mall cigarettes were extremely carcinogenic and extremely addictive – substantially more so than other types of cigarettes; the sale of
this defective product occurred repeatedly over the course of many
years despite American Tobacco’s knowledge that the product was
dangerous to the user’s health; and American Tobacco actively misled
consumers about the health risks associated with smoking. Moreover,
the reprehensible conduct was shown to relate directly to the harm suffered by Mrs. Boerner: a most painful, lingering death following ex181
tensive surgery.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Eden Elec., 370 F.3d at 826.
Id.
Id. at 829.
381 F.3d 811, 814 (8th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 815.
Id. at 814.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 825.
394 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 602-03.
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Although the court noted that “the degree of reprehensibility is the ‘most
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award,’”182
the court remitted the damages down to $5 million, a 1.2:1 ratio, on the
ground that the second Gore Guidepost calls for a smaller ratio when the
compensatory award is already high.183 The court quoted State Farm: “When
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal
to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process
guarantee.”184
These nine cases form the basis of Eighth Circuit precedence regarding
excessive punitive damages litigation and play an important part in evaluating
the outcome of Ondrisek v. Hoffman.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
On appeal before the Eighth Circuit, Alamo first argued that the large
punitive damages award should be eliminated altogether because it was not
designed to deter him, but to punish him for his “unorthodox religious beliefs.” 185 In support, he asserted that since he was incarcerated serving a 175
year sentence, and therefore could not repeat his conduct, there was no deterrence value.186 The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the
two recognized policy objectives for punitive damage awards, to punish the
wrongdoer and deter similar wrongful conduct in others,187 clearly justified a
punitive damages award in this situation.188
The court considered Alamo’s second argument, that the excessive
amount of the award violated due process and Arkansas law, at length.189
Since Arkansas has adopted the federal substantive due process analysis for
excessive punitive damages awards, the court analyzed the federal and state
questions together by applying the Gore Test and Guideposts, noting that the
first Guidepost, reprehensibility, was the most important factor of the three.190
The court then laid out the specific factors it could consider when determining reprehensibility:
[1] the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; [2] the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the
health or safety of others; [3] the target of the conduct had financial
182. Id. at 602.
183. Id. at 603.
184. Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,

425 (2003)).
185. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 2012).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1027 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008)).
188. Id. at 1028.
189. Id. at 1028-31.
190. Id. at 1028.
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vulnerability; [4] the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and [5] the harm was the result of intentional malice,
191
trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.

In applying the Gore Factors to the instant case, the court determined
that the harm caused was physical in nature, “evidenced a reckless disregard
for the health and safety” of the Plaintiffs, and was particularly reprehensible
in that Alamo was “in a position of trust as a religious leader, yet he continually abused that power to subject children to substantial physical and emotional abuse.”192 Moreover, this was not the first time Alamo had been found
liable for battering children, and in Miller, the lesser damages imposed193 had
not deterred him from repeating his conduct, so greater damages were appropriate.194 The court thus concluded Alamo’s actions were “exceptionally
reprehensible, justifying significant punitive damages.”195
As to the second factor, the court agreed that the 10:1 ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages was unconstitutionally excessive, despite
the reprehensibility of Alamo’s actions.196 The court set forth the prevailing
standards on damage award ratios from State Farm, Gore, and Haslip, noting
that when “compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps
only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due
process guarantee” and that “an award of more than four times the amount of
compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety.”197 Given that the Supreme Court of the United States had already determined that a $1 million compensatory award was substantial, the $3 million
compensatory award in Ondrisek undoubtedly also qualified as substantial.198
The court then recounted three instances in which it had reviewed punitive damages cases with compensatory damages greater than $1 million and a
ratio of greater than 1:1.199 After reviewing the damage ratios in Eden Electrical, Consenco, and Boerner, the Ondrisek court then turned to the third
Guidepost in Gore and compared punitive damages in similar civil cases.
191. Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
419 (2003)).
192. Id. at 1029.
193. In the previous case, one boy received $1,000 in compensatory damages and
$5,000 in punitive damages, the second received $50,000 in compensatory damages
and $500,000 in punitive damages (a 5:1 and 10:1 ratio respectively). Miller v. Tony
& Susan Alamo Found., 748 F. Supp. 695, 698-99 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
194. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1029.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1030.
197. Id. at 1029 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408, 425 (2003)).
198. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
426 (2003)).
199. Id. at 1029-30.
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The court considered both predecessors of the instant case. In Miller, the
damages were 10:1, but the court noted that the compensatory damages in
Miller were significantly smaller ($50,000) and that the case was not appealed.200 In Kolbeck, the ratio was only 2:1, but Kolbeck was “only carrying
out Alamo’s orders.”201
The court then compared the instant case to Eden Electrical, Consenco,
and Boerner. The court also attached an appendix containing a chart detailing all Eighth Circuit Cases appealed on the basis of excessive punitive damage awards since Gore.202 It held that Alamo’s conduct was more reprehensible than in Consenco or Boerner, and concluded that “a reduction to 2:1 or
1:1 was not required.”203 And, although Alamo’s actions were no less reprehensible than those of the defendant in Eden Electrical, the greater compensatory damages awarded in the instant case warranted a ratio of only 4:1, or $12
million per plaintiff.204

V. COMMENT
A. Methodology
Ondrisek v. Hoffman illuminates the difficulties with applying the Gore
Guideposts and other Supreme Court precedent. Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding punitive damages has varied, with the general trend indicating that high ratio punitive damages awards are becoming a thing of the
past.205 In 1991, the Haslip Court determined that awards in excess of 4:1
may be near the constitutional limit.206 In 1993, the Court in TXO rejected
the use of ratios in the given decision and affirmed a 524:1 award.207 In
1996, the Gore Court again reversed course, citing with approval Haslip’s 4:1
ratio and reinterpreting the ratio in TXO to be “not more than 10 to 1” when
considering the potential harm the plaintiff could have suffered.208 In State
Farm in 2003 the Court agreed with the 4:1 ratio in Haslip, as well as the
10:1 maximum ratio in TXO, but suggested that a 1:1 ratio is appropriate for

Id. at 1030.
Id.
Id. at 1031 n.4.
Id. at 1030.
Id. at 1030-31.
See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426
(2003) (reversing 145:1 ratio); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 560
(1996) (reversing 500:1 ratio); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
462 (1993) (affirming 524:1 ratio); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23
(1991) (affirming 4:1 ratio).
206. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23.
207. TXO, 509 U.S. at 462.
208. Gore, 517 U.S. at 581.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
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high compensatory damages cases.209 In a relatively short span of time the
Court has greatly restrained the ability of juries to impose outlier verdicts
where punitive damages are excessively large.
The Eighth Circuit has had the difficult task of applying these amorphous standards to cases in its own jurisdiction, with mixed success.210 Since
Gore, the Eighth Circuit has entertained 27 cases that disputed whether punitive damage awards were excessive,211 which ultimately resulted in ratios as
high as 100:1212 and punitive damages as much as $18 million.213 There are
two particular areas of concern which this subsection addresses: first, the
depth of analysis with which the Gore Guideposts are applied to cases, and
second, the degree to which the factors are useful at all in determining the
constitutionality of punitive damages.
In an attempt to weigh the appropriateness of the punitive damages
award in Ondrisek with the rest of Eighth Circuit punitive damages cases, I
constructed two charts for comparison purposes, much like the Eighth Circuit
did in its opinion in Ondrisek. I selected the cases that were handed down in
2004 or later, after State Farm was decided, and in which the amount of punitive damages was held to be substantial (i.e., $500,000 and over).214 This
produced nine cases for comparison.
I then charted these nine cases, along with Ondrisek, based on the Gore
Guideposts: the compensatory damages awarded, the final ratio, the reprehensibility of the conduct based on the Gore Factors, and the comparable civil
and criminal punishments. 215 The Supreme Court held in State Farm that
“[t]he existence of any one of [the Gore] factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect.”216 Thus, I included the
number of Gore Factors that were present in each case. As further means of
measuring reprehensibility, I included how many of these factors were particularly compelling, based upon both my own judgment and the weight the
court seemed to give to that factor, which I discuss in greater detail in the
text. I judged the severity of the comparable civil and criminal punishments
on a high/low scale based on whether the conduct amounted to a felony in
209. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
210. See generally Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1031 n.4 (8th Cir. 2012)

(providing an appendix that lists Eighth Circuit cases addressing the constitutionality
of punitive damages).
211. Id.
212. See United States v. Big D Enters., Inc., 184 F.3d 924, 933 (8th Cir. 1999).
213. See Consenco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 381 F.3d 811, 825
(8th Cir. 2004).
214. See, e.g., Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 833 (8th
Cir. 2004) (holding that a punitive damages award of $5,000,000 was “conscienceshocking” and violated due process).
215. See infra Appendix A.
216. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003).
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criminal cases or fines and liability in excess of $500,000 in similar civil cases. For example, a case that could have been a felony would be rated high,
whereas a civil case with a potential of $150,000 worth of compensatory
damages would be rated low.
Of course, the chart should not be considered authoritative. The Gore
Guideposts are, after all, merely guidance in determining when a punitive
award violates due process; it is not a mechanistic test. The chart is to be
used for only comparison purposes to find general trends in the application of
the Gore Guideposts, the same way the Eighth Circuit attached a similar chart
in the appendix to its opinion.

B. Comparison
Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases
Case Name &
Description

Compelling
Gore
Factors219

Comparable
Punishments

1

1

High

4:1

5

4

High

$500,000

4:1

3

2

High

$665,000

4:1

2

0

High

$3,500,000

2:1

2

1

High

$4,025,000

2:1

4

1

High

$600,000

1:1

3

2

High

$1,150,000

1:1

3

2

High

$1,446,500

0.77:1

1

0

High

$14,000,000

0.07:1

4

2

High

Compensatory
Damages217

Ratio

Eden Electrical
Fake
Dealership

$2,100,000

4.8:1

Ondrisek
Abuse in Cult

$3,000,000

Stodsgill
Nurse
Malpractice
Diesel
Machinery
Dealership Contract
Consenco
Subprime Mortgages
Boerner
Death of Smoker
Williams
Employment
Discrimination
Moore
Insurance:
Arson
JCB
Conversion: Machinery
White
Child
Molestation

Gore
Factors
Present218

217. These compensatory damages amounts have been taken from the chart in
Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1031 n.4 (8th Cir. 2012).
218. See infra Appendix A.
219. See infra Appendix A.
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The first case, Consenco, involved institution-wide wrongdoing by a
subprime mortgage lending institution that was stealing a competitor’s information on customers.220 When reviewing the Gore Factors in this case, only
two factors are present, and only one of them was particularly compelling. It
is clear that the victim mortgage company was neither particularly vulnerable
nor physically harmed by the aggressor mortgage company’s actions. While
the aggressor company did encourage their new hires to bring over their competitor’s information with them,221 evidencing intentionality, it was not particularly malicious in nature, simply a dubious business practice to get ahead
in the market. The only truly compelling factor in this case was that this “encouragement” to bring over their competitor’s information was a companywide occurrence repeated many times.222
Boerner was a typical tobacco tort suit from 2005.223 The tobacco company used trickery and evidenced a casual disregard for their consumers’
health and safety by intentionally misleading them about the safety of Pall
Mall cigarettes.224 Unsurprisingly, the use of the highly carcinogenic cigarettes resulted in Mrs. Boerner’s slow death from lung cancer.225 On the other hand, Mrs. Boerner was an adult fully capable of reading the Surgeon General’s warnings about the effect of cigarettes, which were published as early
as 1965.226 Since she continued to smoke for a good fifteen years after the
warnings began being published,227 there was clearly some element of comparative fault in this case. Additionally, the tobacco company did not have
any malicious intent to inflict lung cancer and death upon Mrs. Boerner.228
Finally, the tobacco company’s actions were only indirectly responsible for
Mrs. Boerner’s death. The only factor that was particularly compelling in this
case was how the tobacco company’s actions affected many different customers over a period of many years.
At first blush, Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co. appears to be an immensely compelling case for punitive damages: the white employees acted
outrageously in harassing the black employees.229 An examination of the
Gore Test and Gore Factors, however, reveals a more modest case overall.
220. Consenco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 381 F.3d 811, 815 (8th
Cir. 2004).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 817.
223. Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2005).
224. Id. at 602-03.
225. Id. at 598.
226. See Cent. for Disease Control, History of the Surgeon General’s Reports on
Smoking and Health, CDC.GOV, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/history/ (last updated July 6, 2009).
227. Boerner, 394 F.3d at 598.
228. Id. at 603.
229. 378 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 2004).
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The employer’s agents showed a severe disregard for the black employee’s
mental health and safety by creating an intimidating environment where violence seemed imminent.230 The actions of the employer’s agents were clearly
malicious and intentional in nature, not mere negligence. The black employees were relatively vulnerable, given that they were subordinates whose livelihoods depended upon their jobs. On the other hand, however, there was no
physical harm done to the plaintiff, or any other black employee. Also, as the
Eighth Circuit noted, it was unclear how many of the prior incidents actually
affected the Plaintiff; he seemed to have just copied the allegations of another
employee in an earlier case.231 All told, there were three Gore Factors present, but only two – intentional or malicious conduct and repetitive occurrences – were truly compelling.232
Stodsgill, the nursing home case,233 is even less compelling, as far as
excessive punitive damages cases go. The most persuasive factor in this case
was the amount of physical harm the decedent underwent, up to and including
her wrongful death.234 Also compelling was the decedent’s vulnerability.
She was a woman confined to a wheelchair in a nursing home.235 Her degree
of comprehension and ability to communicate, which would have affected
the degree of her vulnerability, were unclear. The nurses’ disregard for her
health and safety by improper charting and failure to bring the doctor
were also noteworthy.236 What really diminished the overall weight of
this case was the lack of intent displayed by the nurses. This was a case
of negligence, not malice.237 The point of punitive damages is to punish the
defendant for his conduct, and negligent conduct is less worthy of punishment
than deliberate, unapologetic conduct like that of Alamo.238 To be sure,
this was a terrible event worthy of significant compensatory damages, but
it ultimately amounted to a run-of-the-mill medical malpractice claim. To
award this case a 4:1 punitive damages ratio was a bit excessive when compared to the other cases.239
Diesel Machinery involved a cancelled dealership contract because the
manufacturer wanted to sell its product line in its own stores,240 and it was
Id. at 797-98.
Id. at 793-94.
See infra Appendix A.
Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2004).
See id. at 830.
Id.
Id. at 832.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 829-30 (noting that “an award of punitive damages requires
proof that the defendant acted wantonly in causing the injury or with such a conscious
indifference to the consequences that malice may be inferred”).
239. Id. at 834.
240. Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 826-28 (8th
Cir. 2005).
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
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not a particularly compelling case. There was no physical harm done to the
plaintiff company; the harm was only a lost dealership contract.241 The manufacturer did not act in disregard for the dealer’s health and safety.242
The “victim” company was a business that sought legal representation,243
which did not make them particularly vulnerable. Although the manufacturer
terminated several contracts around the country,244 the decision cannot be
characterized as malicious; indeed, it appeared to have been strictly a business decision (albeit a poor one). However, it was done intentionally, without
regard for the law or consideration of the dealers.245 This case has only two
Gore Factors present, the repetitiveness of the conduct and intentional trickery, but neither is particularly compelling. Nevertheless, the damages ratio
was 4:1.246
JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank was a case involving a debtor third
party whose creditor bank illegally repossessed and sold the debtor’s equipment that was stored on a another creditor’s property.247 This case is similar
to Diesel Machinery in several ways: there was no physical harm inflicted,
the parties were both companies that make multimillion dollar business
deals,248 and there was little disregard for the company’s health or safety.
Unlike Diesel Machinery, the conduct was intentional and can be aptly characterized as “trickery,” but evidence indicated that this scheme was only perpetrated once. All told, only one Gore Factor was present, and it was not
very persuasive.
Moore, the alleged arson and bad faith insurance case,249 was a
moderately compelling case. Moore was not particularly vulnerable as an
average adult. However, although Moore was not physically assaulted, the
trial court aptly pointed out that he suffered serious harm by being falsely
accused of arson.250 The insurance company evidenced a disregard for
Moore’s mental health and safety because it knew or should have known that
such a severe false accusation would inflict emotional distress, and it similarly disregarded any threats to his physical health and safety that may have
resulted from his incarceration.251 The insurance carrier’s decision to accuse
Moore of arson was a fairly routine business practice and seemed more economically motivated than by personal malice.252 Three of the Gore Factors
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 829.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 828-29.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 840.
539 F.3d 862, 867 (8th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 867-68.
Moore v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 790.
Id.
Id.
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were present, and two of them – harm inflicted and repetitiveness – were
fairly compelling here.
The most compelling punitive damages case yet has been White, in
which Plaintiff was falsely accused of molesting his stepdaughter.253 Like in
Moore, Plaintiff suffered severe harm stemming from false accusations that
were more than purely economic in nature.254 Defendants also displayed a
disregard for White’s economic health by effectively ruining his life and his
physical health and safety,255 since pedophiles tend to be ostracized in prison.
While Plaintiff was not particularly vulnerable, given his status as a capable
adult, his wife’s conduct was shockingly malicious and the police officer’s
manipulation of the case can be characterized as trickery. Also, this was not
his wife’s first time threatening to accuse a husband of molesting her daughter, indicating repeated conduct on her part.256 Four of the five Gore Factors
were present, and the harm White suffered and the malice displayed by the
defendants were particularly compelling.

1. Reprehensibility: Eden Electrical Versus Ondrisek
According to the Gore Guideposts, one must first consider the reprehensibility of Alamo’s conduct.257 Ondrisek sets an unprecedented high in the
category of reprehensibility. It is the only Eighth Circuit case in the decade
since State Farm wherein all five Gore factors are present, and four of them
are extremely compelling.258
The Gore Factors ask whether the harm was physical or economic,
whether the conduct was in reckless disregard for the health and safety of
others, whether it was intentional, malicious, or deceitful, whether the target
of the conduct was in a vulnerable position, and whether the defendant repeatedly engaged in the conduct even knowing that it was harmful.259 As for
physical harm, the boys were subject to severe mental and physical abuse.260
There was also an element of economic harm because they performed extensive work for the compound without pay starting at a very young age.261 This
harm was done in blatant disregard for the mental and physical safety of the
boys, since they both sustained permanent injuries and contemplated suicide.262 As for the Plaintiffs’ vulnerability, it is clear that they were extreme-

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

White v. McKinley, 605 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 528.
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
See infra Appendix A.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 576.
Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1024.
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ly vulnerable given their young age, isolated upbringing, and lack of parental
protection.263 Moreover, Alamo was in a position of great power over them
as the head of their religious order and entire community.264 As for the isolation or repetitiveness of the defendant’s actions, it went on throughout the
Plaintiffs’ childhoods.265 Moreover, Alamo was quite aware of the legal effect of his actions, given the previous lawsuit alleging the same conduct years
earlier.266 The only thing that could have made Ondrisek even more compelling under a Gore Factor analysis was direct evidence that Alamo tormented
the Plaintiffs exclusively out of malice. While one may certainly infer that
there was some degree of intentional malice present, there is not enough evidence to make this factor as compelling as the other four.
While the Gore Factors are not dispositive, they are fair indicators of
reprehensibility. However, even common moral principles indicate that this
situation is completely reprehensible. Because of the extreme reprehensibility
evidenced by Alamo in this case, Ondrisek occupies a special place in Eighth
Circuit punitive damages jurisprudence. If Ondrisek tops the reprehensibility
chart, then district courts would have a concrete high-water mark to compare
the cases before them to.267 In essence, Ondrisek was an opportunity to provide clarity and consistency to lower courts and bring greater harmony to
punitive damages decisions in the Eighth Circuit.
This opportunity appears to have been a missed one, however. The
court notably skirted the opportunity to compare Alamo’s conduct to that of
Amana in Eden Electrical, the court’s earlier high-water mark.268 The court
wrote: “This panel does not suggest that Alamo’s actions are any less reprehensible than the defendant’s conduct in [Eden Electrical], but – given the
larger compensatory damage award here – the punitive damages should not
exceed a 4:1 ratio to maintain the notions of fundamental fairness and due
process.”269 Despite having this elaborate test to measure the reprehensibility
of defendants’ conduct and constructing a detailed chart for comparison purposes, the Eighth Circuit refused to use these tools to draw conclusions, and
instead jumped right to the issue of the ratio.
However, it is easy enough to apply the Gore Test to the present case
and reach the conclusion that the Eighth Circuit so notably refused to draw.
The results of this application show that Ondrisek should have been the new
high-water mark and would have necessitated a ratio the same or higher than
Eden Electrical, thereby surpassing the 4:1 ratio set out in Haslip.270 The

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 1023-24.
Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1023-24.
See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
See infra Appendix A.
Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1029-30.
Id. at 1030-31.
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991).
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compensatory and punitive damages in the two cases are roughly comparable:
$2.1 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages
in Eden Electrical,271 compared to $3 million in compensatory damages and
$12 million in punitive damages in Ondrisek. 272 However, the reprehensibility of the defendants’ conduct is not comparable, and that is the most important factor.273
In Eden Electrical, both parties were multi-million-dollar companies assisted by legal counsel.274 In Ondrisek, on the other hand, the victims were
vulnerable boys taken advantage of by a religious leader.275 In Eden Electrical, there was only evidence of one fraudulent scheme.276 In Ondrisek, the
abuse went on for years,277 and Alamo had been sued before for precisely the
same actions.278 In Eden Electrical, the victim company lost only money
(albeit, a substantial amount of it).279 The Plaintiffs in Ondrisek, however,
sustained economic as well as very severe physical damage.280 Seth Calagnia
had to watch his father be beaten until his father cried and could not get up.281
Both boys had to listen to Alamo tell them repeatedly that they were worthless and would go to hell.282 Further, both boys contemplated suicide based
on the repeated physical and emotional abuse they suffered.283 The two cases
simply do not compare.
It is clear that the reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions should have
favored making Ondrisek the high-water mark over Eden. Although the Supreme Court asserts that the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct is the
most important factor,284 the Ondrisek decision belies this claim since the
defendant’s conduct in Ondrisek was far more reprehensible than Eden Electrical, and yet the Plaintiff received a lower ratio in Ondrisek.
It is Eden Electrical, then, which continues to present a problem when
harmonizing punitive damages cases in the Eighth Circuit. In Eden Electrical, the damages awarded were slightly lower, the degree of reprehensibility
Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 370 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 2004).
Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1027, 1031.
Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1024.
Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 959 (N.D. Iowa 2003).
Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1029.
Eden Elec., 370 F.3d at 829.
Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1023-24.
Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 748 F. Supp. 695, 699 (W.D.
Ark. 1990).
279. See Eden Elec., 258 F. Supp. 2d at 963.
280. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1023-24.
281. Id. at 1024; Brief of Appellees, supra note 21, at *10-11.
282. Brief of Appellees, supra note 21, at *6.
283. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1024.
284. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (“Perhaps the most
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”).
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
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was by far lower, and yet the multiplier was .8 higher than in Ondrisek.285
Indeed, it had a .8 ratio higher than any other case.286 Perhaps the easiest
thing for the court to do would have been to overturn, expressly or implicitly,
the award in Eden Electrical and present the 4:1 ratio to be the new maximum. After all, the award was in 2004, a full nine years ago, the facts are
easily distinguishable from Ondrisek, and Eden Electrical was one of the first
cases applying the State Farm decision. It would have been a simple matter
to distinguish Eden Electrical on any of these grounds or not bring the case
up at all. However, the court selected Eden Electrical as one of the three
cases to review as precedent and fully set forth the factual background of that
case and its high-water 4.8:1 ratio.287 On the flimsy grounds of the small
difference in compensatory damages between the two cases, the court effectively held in Ondrisek that Eden Electrical would remain the Eighth Circuit
high-water mark with a 4.8:1 ratio.288
The concept of a ratio is inherently flawed. Compensatory damages are
different for a reason; they equal whatever amount it takes to make a plaintiff
whole.289 Punitive damages, on the other hand, are meant to punish and
deter similar future conduct.290 In Eden Electrical, the compensatory damages were meant to make Eden Electrical’s business whole after Amana’s
fraudulent scheme.291 In Ondrisek, the compensatory damages were to
make the boys whole after all the terrible abuse they suffered while growing
up.292 The Eighth Circuit used the small differences in the cases’ compensatory damages to support a different, higher multiplier for Eden Electrical,
even though in truth the amounts of the compensatory damages should be
completely unrelated to the amount of punitive damages awarded, and the
multipliers are just random numbers. The court’s justification for keeping
Eden Electrical as its high-water mark is unpersuasive and at odds with the
purpose of punitive damages.

285. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B.
(compare Ondrisek with Eden Electrical).
286. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B.
287. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1029-30.
288. Id. at 1030-31.
289. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419
(2003) (“It should be presumed that a plaintiff has been made whole for his injuries
by compensatory damages, so punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant’s culpability . . . is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further
sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.”).
290. Id. at 416; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
291. See Eden Elect., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 370 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 2004).
292. See Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1027.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

27

Created on: 1/27/2014 6:36:00 PM
Missouri Law Review,
Vol. 78, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. Last
8 Printed: 1/27/2014 9:12:00 PM

File: Shands – Final Formatting – 1/23/14

944

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

2.

[Vol. 78

Under-Emphasis on Reprehensibility

Also of note is the lack of emphasis placed by the court on the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct and the court’s overemphasis on the ratio.
For example, the chart in the Eighth Circuit’s appendix to Ondrisek focused
on quantifying cases by the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages and
made no mention of reprehensibility.293 While this omission could be attributed to a number of things, the fact that they were compared by ratio and
award size alone is still significant.
In Ondrisek, the lesser emphasis on reprehensibility is particularly noticeable. As detailed above, the extreme reprehensibility of Alamo’s acts
evidently did not warrant a ratio equal to or higher than Eden Electrical, even
though Amana’s conduct was far less reprehensible than Alamo’s. A similar
effect is observed in the other cases.
In Stogsdill, the gross negligence of the nurses hardly rises to the level
of the deliberate conduct of Alamo, but it had the same overall ratio of 4:1.294
The defendant’s conduct in Moore, the arson-insurance case, was quite reprehensible, as Mr. Moore had to deal with economic damages from the bad
faith of the insurance company and criminal charges for arson.295 Yet, despite the reprehensible conduct by the insurance company, Moore only received a 1:1 ratio.296 In Williams, the conduct of Mr. Williams’ employer and
employees was also quite reprehensible, given the extremely hostility and
threatening behavior black employees received, but he, too, only received a
1:1 ratio, despite this high degree of reprehensibility.297
White is perhaps the only case wherein the actions of the defendants are
close to those of Alamo in Ondrisek. Maliciously and falsely accusing one’s
husband of sexually molesting his adopted daughter, then covering up evidence that would exonerate him,298 is utterly reprehensible by society’s
standards. The defendants’ actions resulted in White’s wrongful conviction
as a pedophile and completely ruined his life.299 Despite this, White only
received a 0.07:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, which is the
smallest ratio yet in cases that qualify as having a “substantial” compensatory
damages award.300

293. See id. at 1031 n.4.
294. See Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 831, 833 (8th

Cir. 2004).
295. Moore v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 781, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2009).
296. Id. at 791.
297. Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 799 (8th Cir. 2004).
298. White v. McKinley, 605 F.3d 525, 528-29 (8th Cir. 2010).
299. See generally id. at 538.
300. Id. at 539. It is important to remember that in White the jury chose to
award only $1 million in punitive damages; this was not a case of remittance by the
court. Id.
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The brief attention paid to the reprehensibility prong and the lack of
weight it is given leads to the conclusion that reprehensibility is not, in fact,
the most important factor in the Eighth Circuit. Instead, the most important
factor is the ratio.

3. The Ratio Requirement Pile-Up
The ratio requirement also merits consideration. According to Supreme
Court jurisprudence, a 1:1 ratio is recommended in cases in which the compensatory damages awarded are “substantial.”301 In Ondrisek the Plaintiffs
received $3 million in compensatory damages.302 This suggests that a 1:1
ratio would certainly be appropriate here, although the presiding court has
some latitude to adjust this number if there are exceptional circumstances.303
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Eden Electrical,304 which had a higher ratio and lower reprehensibility,305 and this suggests that no more than
three (if any) justices would have found that a 4.8:1 ratio does not violate due
process, even in cases where the compensatory damages are substantial.
Taken further, this indicates that the 1:1 ratio mentioned in State Farm306 is
not a very rigid rule. The 4:1 ratio in Ondrisek might not be as daring as the
holding in State Farm suggests.
The Eighth Circuit’s analysis slightly varies from the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. First, it sets a lower threshold for a compensatory damages
award to be considered “substantial”307 but routinely allows for ratios higher
than 1:1 in such cases.308 Indeed, of ten cases with substantial damages, six
have a ratio of more than 1:1 and four have a ratio of 4:1 or more.309 However, the court seems to suggest in Ondrisek that it now considers a “substantial” amount of compensatory damages to be $1 million, which is back in
harmony with the Supreme Court but goes against earlier Eighth Circuit precedent.310 The court stated, “In the years since Gore, this court has seldom
reviewed the punitive damages with compensatory damages greater than $1
million.”311 While this is certainly not dispositive, it is relevant that the
Eighth Circuit chose to only compare Ondrisek to other cases above $1 milState Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 2012).
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425-26.
Amana Co. v. Eden Elec., Ltd., 543 U.S. 1150 (2005).
See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B.
The 1:1 ratio was given greater weight after Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
554 U.S. 471, 514-15 (2008). See cases cited supra note 113.
307. See Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 833 (8th
Cir. 2004).
308. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B.
309. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B.
310. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1029 (8th Cir. 2012).
311. Id.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
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lion, not $500,000, the current marker.312 Yet, even re-adjusting the threshold
for what is considered a “substantial” compensatory damage award back to
$1 million, four of the seven cases would still be above a 1:1 ratio.313 The
Eighth Circuit seems to err towards affirming higher ratios, even in cases
with substantial compensatory awards.
Despite its tendency to frequently affirm higher ratios of damages than
suggested to be constitutional by State Farm, the Eighth Circuit has never
reached the point of affirming a 5:1 ratio in a case in which damages were
substantial.314 While this does have the desired effect of restricting outlier
punitive damage awards,315 it also creates a pile-up of 4:1 ratio cases.316
Stogsdill and Diesel Machinery are both 4:1 ratio cases that have a far lower
reprehensibility score, yet have the same ratio as Ondrisek.317 This might be
explained by the lower compensatory damages awarded in each, $500,000
and $665,000 respectively.318 The court noted in both cases that the amount
of compensatory damages awarded was “substantial,” as it also did in both
Ondrisek and Eden Electrical, but the damages were still only about one fifth
the amount of the awards in Ondrisek and Eden Electrical.

4.

Comparable Punishments

The third prong of the Gore Guideposts, comparable civil and criminal
punishments, appears to be by far the least important factor for consideration
in Eighth Circuit cases. In three of the analyzed cases (Williams, Moore, and
Stogsdill), the Eighth Circuit did a full analysis of criminal and civil punishments.319 In one case the court did a very brief analysis of this Guidepost
(Diesel Machinery).320 In five cases, no comparison was made by the court at
all (White, JCB, Boerner, Eden Electrical, and Consenco).
Ondrisek falls into the second category. The court at least addressed the
third Guidepost, but it reduced the entire analysis into two sentences.321 In
312. Recall that the Eighth Circuit determined in Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., that a $500,000 compensatory damages award was held to be substantial.
377 F.3d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 2004).
313. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B.
314. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B.
315. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
316. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B.
317. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B.
318. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B.
319. Moore v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 781, 791 (8th Cir. 2009);
Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 2004); Stogsdill v.
Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir. 2004).
320. Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 840 (8th
Cir. 2005).
321. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1030 (8th Cir. 2012).
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those two sentences, the court compared the damages in the instant case to
those in Kolbeck and Miller but did not consider any other civil cases or potential criminal punishments Alamo could have received, as the Gore Test
requires them to do. The only analysis the court did was to differentiate the
facts of Ondrisek from the prior two cases involving abuse in TACM.322 The
third prong of the Gore Test undeniably received short shrift from the Eighth
Circuit in the instant case. However, this might be a reflection of the fact that
this Guidepost provides very little guidance, since all of the cases this author
reviewed warranted significant criminal or civil liability.323

C. The Problem & Solutions
This review of Eighth Circuit cases with substantial compensatory damages awards reveals several disturbing trends. The Gore Guideposts call
for an evaluation of the constitutionality of punitive damages based upon
the compensatory damages awarded, the final ratio, the reprehensibility of
the conduct based on the Gore Factors, and the comparable civil and
criminal punishments. 324
The first Guidepost, the ratio, has become the ultimate yardstick of constitutionality in Eighth Circuit cases. All of the jury awards were reduced in
order to comply with Haslip’s 4:1 ratio requirement,325 if they were not already under that ratio. The sole exception is Eden Electrical, whose additional 0.8 multiplier is hardly significant considering the 524:1 ratio the Supreme Court approved in TXO.326 Several awards have been cut down even
further to 1:1 ratios, as per State Farm.327 This creates a pile up of cases
with awards in the 4:1 ratio range and the 1:1 ratio range that are factually
distinct but treated the same.
The second Guidepost, reprehensibility, has been significantly deemphasized despite the Supreme Court’s claim that it is the most important factor to weigh when considering the constitutionality of punitive damages
awards.328 This Guidepost’s importance has been replaced with the ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages as the most relevant concern.
Ondrisek had a slightly lower ratio than Eden Electrical, despite how much
more compelling its Gore Factor analysis was. This same mismatch of ratio
and reprehensibility analysis holds true in the other eight cases with “substantial” punitive damages awards reviewed by the Eighth Circuit.

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id.
See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B.
See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B.
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991).
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459, 462 (1993).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Campbell, 538 U.S. 480, 425 (2003).
See supra Part V.B.2.
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The third Guidepost, comparable punishments, has been even further reduced in importance. Few cases gave this Guidepost more than a sentence of
analysis, and in fully half of the cases no analysis was made.
When the Supreme Court handed down the Gore Test, lower courts
were to first consider the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, then the
ratio of damages, and third, the severity of comparative civil and criminal
punishments. The Eighth Circuit today jumps straight to the ratio, glosses
over the reprehensibility, and avoids consideration of comparable punishments entirely. This creates a baffling hierarchy of cases with no clear
benchmark for trial courts to evaluate their cases against, which no doubt
results in widely inconsistent punitive damages awards and frequent appeals.
The Eighth Circuit is not wholly to blame, however. The Gore Test,
in an effort to provide greater guidance, has merely given courts semiobjective criteria to use in making subjective judgments. It has been critiqued
from the start as giving a veneer of objectivity to a completely subjective
process.329 As the dissenting justices in Gore predicted,330 the Guideposts
provide little to no guidance. It is no wonder that the Eighth Circuit has
seized upon the ratio requirement as the main factor of punitive damages
analysis; it only involves some quick math, no real analysis, and looks suitably objective on paper.
This problem has been further complicated in the Eighth Circuit by the
ratio caps set forth in Haslip and State Farm. Punitive damages are driven by
an analysis of facts, and drawing bright line tests to analyze facts is notoriously difficult. This is why determinations of fact are often handed off to the
jury to decide. Instead, the Eighth Circuit is forced into a role where it must
evaluate not only the facts of the case, but also the jury’s evaluation of those
facts. It understandably attempts to circumnavigate these difficulties by affirming or overturning awards based upon pure numbers. Thus, the court
mechanistically assigns cases almost uniformly at whole number integer multipliers clustered around the 4:1 and 1:1 marks – even when those cases are
factually distinct from one another.
Unquestionably, the Supreme Court needs to provide better guidance for
evaluating punitive damages awards, and the Eighth Circuit needs to adhere
to that advice more closely than they have adhered to the existing guidance
in Gore. The problem is clear: outlier juries award excessive punitive damages. Perhaps instead of fixing the excessive damages, the better solution
is to fix the outlier juries. This could be accomplished by providing the jury
with a revised set of jury instructions regarding the limits of punitive damag-

329. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (U.S. 1996) (Scalia,
J. dissenting).
330. See id. at 605 (“In truth, the ‘guideposts’ mark a road to nowhere; they provide no real guidance at all.”); id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Gore Test “has only a vague concept of substantive due process, a ‘raised eyebrow’
test as its ultimate guide . . .”) (internal citation omitted).
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es.331 It could also be fixed by retrying only the issue of the amount of
damages before a new jury.332 This would be feasible because there are relatively few outlier juries,333 so retrials would be infrequent, and the new juries
would be unlikely to also be outliers. Moreover, a new trial on the issue
of damages would encourage both parties to settle to avoid the costs of retrying the case. Or, one may simply defer to the jury’s determination, as Justice
Scalia suggests in his dissent in TXO, since the punitive damages decision is
a subjective decision “about the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage”
and is better left to the discretion of the jury, who act as the “voice of
the community.”334

VI. CONCLUSION
Ondrisek presents us with a chance to review Eighth Circuit jurisprudence through the lens of a model case. Ondrisek has been the most factually
reprehensible case to be appealed to the Eighth Circuit since State Farm was
handed down, according to both common moral principles and the test the
Supreme Court formulated in Gore. The Eighth Circuit was presented with a
chance to shed light on its application of the Gore Test and the constitutional
amount of punitive damages. Instead, however, the court declined to set
aside its previous high-water mark ruling in Eden Electrical and sidestepped
a comparison of the reprehensibility of the cases.
331. The Oklahoma legislature evidently thought along the same lines, as it
amended its punitive damages law so that it now divides the procedure up into a two
step process, and the jury decides the amount of damages according to a variable
schedule. See 8 Okla. Prac., Product Liability Law § 12:18 (2012 ed.) (citing 23
Okla. Stat. § 9.1(B) (Supp. 2005) and Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions – Civil §
5.6 (2002)).
332. Several courts seem to agree with this approach. See, e.g., Bach v. First
Union Nat. Bank, 149 F. App. 354, 366 (6th Cir. 2005) (“This fact compels the conclusion that the punitive damage award is duplicative, and that either a new trial on
punitive damages or a remittitur of the damages awarded is appropriate.”) (emphasis
added); CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375,
392 (3d Cir. 2004) (The court “determined that the jury’s punitive damages determination must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on the question of punitive damages.”); Goddard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 120 P.3d 1260, 1284 (Ore.
2005) (in an appeal based on excessive punitive damages in a bad faith insurance
claim, the Supreme Court of Oregon ordered the case remanded for a new trial solely
on the issue of punitive damages, unless the plaintiff agreed to a remitter of 3x the
compensatory damages).
333. See, e.g., Joseph J. Chambers, IN RE EXXON VALDEZ: APPLICATION OF DUE
PROCESS CONSTRAINTS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 195,
200-01 (2003) (quoting several sources refuting the perceived “punitive damages
crisis” on the basis that this belief is “based upon anecdotal evidence derived only
from a few well-known outlier cases”).
334. Gore, 517 U.S. at 600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Although Ondrisek represents a missed opportunity, it still provides
some illumination as to Eighth Circuit trends in punitive damages. A comparison of other recent cases reveals that the Eighth Circuit tends to have a
lower threshold than the Supreme Court for what constitutes a “substantial”
compensatory award. However, Ondrisek suggests that the threshold for
what is “substantial” may have moved from $500,000 to $1 million. On the
other hand, while the Eighth Circuit is at least sometimes willing to accept a
lower threshold for what constitutes a substantial award, it is willing to consistently apply a higher ratio to those cases, despite the Supreme Court’s suggestion in State Farm that a 1:1 ratio is appropriate.
Contrasting Ondrisek with other cases also reveals certain trends that
differ from Supreme Court jurisprudence. A comparison between Ondrisek
and Eden Electrical reveals that the ratio requirement may be the most important consideration for the Eighth Circuit when assessing a punitive damages award, not the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct as the Supreme
Court held in Gore. Moreover, the third prong of the Gore Guideposts is deemphasized in most Eighth Circuit cases. Many cases give it short shrift, and
in some cases it is not analyzed at all. This subtle re-ordering of the emphasis
placed on the Gore Guideposts has evidently not been severe enough for the
Supreme Court to do something about it, as it has not granted certiorari to any
of the ten cases reviewed. Whatever the case may be, the Eighth Circuit
missed a golden opportunity in Ondrisek to change the course of punitive
damages in its jurisdiction, and it may have to wait another eight years before
another case as unique as Ondrisek comes along.
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APPENDIX A

Victim
Vulnerability

Repeated
Incidents

Intentional
malice or
trickery

Total
Factors
Present

Total
Compelling
Factors

Consenco335
Subprime
Mortgages
Ondrisek336
Abuse in Cult
Boerner337
Death of Smoker
Eden Electrical338
Fake Dealership
Williams339
Employment
Discrimination
Stodsgill340
Nursing
Malpractice
Diesel Machinery341
Dealership
Contract
JCB342
Conversion:
Machinery
Moore343
Insurance: Arson
White344
Child Molestation

Disregard for
Health &
Safety

Case Name &
Description

Physical
Harm

Presence of Gore Factors in Eight Circuit Cases with “Substantial” Damages

-

-

-

X

X

2

1

X

X

X

X

X

5

4

X

X

-

X

X

4

1

-

-

-

-

X

1

1

-

X

-

X

X

3

2

X

X

X

-

-

3

2

-

-

-

X

X

2

0

-

-

-

-

X

1

0

X

X

-

X

-

3

2

X

X

-

X

X

3

2

- = Gore factor is not present in case
X = Gore factor is present in case
X = Gore factor is both present and particularly compelling in case

335. Consenco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 381 F.3d 811, 824-25
(8th Cir. 2004).
336. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 2012).
337. Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594, 602-03 (8th
Cir. 2005).
338. Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 370 F.3d 824, 828-29 (8th Cir. 2004).
339. Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 797-99 (8th Cir. 2004).
340. Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 832-34 (8th
Cir. 2004).
341. Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 839-40 (8th
Cir. 2005).
342. JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, 539 F.3d 862, 875-77 (8th Cir. 2008).
343. Moore v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 781, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2009).
344. White v. McKinley, 605 F.3d 525, 538-39 (8th Cir. 2010).
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